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Chapter 5 
Unchanged Goals and Strategies but Limited Outcomes 
 
AKIKO KOYASU 
 
Introduction 
 
In this article, the author explains that the starting point of the New Brazil in 
terms of foreign policy was during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration 
(1995-2002). However, the real creators of the New Brazil, and the real turning point, 
came with the Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010). Lula was a 
president who prioritized foreign policy and tried to lead Brazil so that it could act as a 
global player.  
Due to several factors, both domestic and international, Brazil suffered through 
the continuation of the New Brazil’s policies. This is true for foreign policy, too. During 
the four years of Dilma Rousseff’s first term (2011-2014), the active foreign policy that 
embodied the New Brazil almost disappeared. Post-New Brazil’s foreign policies 
became inactive and sometimes inconsistent. Now, after the recent presidential election, 
the most urgent issue for the Rousseff government is an economic recovery and it seems 
difficult to give priority to foreign policies at the moment.   
 
1. The New Brazil’s Foreign Policies: The Cardoso Administration 
 
Here, the author describes the diplomacy of Cardoso administration. Brazil 
actively participated in multilateral negotiations and tried to promote the South 
American integration. Under the leadership of Cardoso, Brazilian foreign policy really 
changed from being low profile to being active in the international community. 
 
1.1. Autonomy through Participation: The Beginning of Active Diplomacy 
 
The Cardoso administration began in January 1995. In the presidential election in 
October 1994, Cardoso received 54.5 % of the vote due to his popularity as the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs from October 1992 to May 1993 and as the Minister of Finance from 
May 1993 to March 1994 during his predecessor Itamar Franco’s administration. The 
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economic stabilization policy, the Real Plan which Cardoso created in his time as 
finance minister was able to defeat 4-digit hyperinflation (See Chapter 2). He was not 
only a professor at the University of São Paulo (USP) but he also had rich experience as 
a politician. Since he led the democratization of Brazil in opposition to the military 
regime (1964-1985), the public placed great trust in Cardoso. He was also famous as a 
prominent sociologist within the international community. 
Brazilian foreign policy researchers, Vigevani and Cepaluni, define the Cardoso 
diplomacy using the concept of “participation” [Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007]. It is a 
concept that describes a type of diplomacy whereby Brazil maintains its autonomy by 
participating actively in the international community and multilateral talks. During 
Cardoso’s administration, by putting into practice a multilateral diplomacy, such as on 
human rights and nuclear non-proliferation, Cardoso conducted active diplomacy. For 
example, Brazil’s human rights-oriented attitude was reflected in the case against 
western countries over AIDS drug patents. In Brazil, anti-AIDS drugs had been freely 
distributed since 1996. However, the treatment involved generic drugs that had copied 
Western pharmaceutical companies’ products. Manufacturing these copies infringed 
patents, and Western countries sued Brazil in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Brazil, appealing to the world through the United Nations and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) with the argument that life (human rights) should be superior to 
profits, was heeded with the result that the Western companies cut the prices of their 
drugs [Koyasu 2004]. 
On nuclear non-proliferation, Brazil not only ratified the Latin American regional 
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco in May 1994, but also signed 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998. Both nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament were "taboo" subjects from the 1960s to the 1980s due to there being a 
military regime in Brazil. After democratization in the mid-1980s, the Cardoso 
administration could finally tackle these issues in a positive way.  
As a symbol of the active participation of Brazil in the international community 
we can point to the election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
As of January 2013, Brazil, like Japan, has been elected ten times to be a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council; this is more than any other country. It is interesting 
to note the years when Brazil was chosen. After 1967-1968, the next election happened 
in 1988-1989. After that, Brazil was elected in 1994-1995, 1998-1999, 2004-2005 and 
2010-2011. 
The first two elections almost overlap with the Cardoso administration, with the 
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remaining two periods belonging to the Lula administration. Brazil was not elected 
during the economic instability in the era of the military regime from 1964 of 1985, but 
in the 1990s Brazil was received again as a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council. We can say the same thing about UN peacekeeping operations. Since the 1990s, 
Brazil has been participating actively not only in election monitoring and military 
surveillance activities but also in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and Central 
America. 
Brazilian diplomacy under the Cardoso administration especially its emphasis on 
the global agenda is reflected in the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Since we call the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Itamaraty Palace” 
(Palácio Itamaraty), we tend to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Itamaraty.” The 
men who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cardoso administration were 
two specialists in the field of Brazilian diplomacy, Luiz Felipe Lampreia (1995-2001) 
and Celso Lafer (2001-2002). When Lampreia was Foreign Minister, the section 
responsible for issues such as human rights, social issues, and disarmament was created 
in Itamaraty. This reflected the domestic and global situation surrounding Brazil in the 
1990s, for example, Brazil’s democratization and the end of the Cold War. [Gonzaga da 
Silva et al. 2010]. 
 
1.2. The Characteristics of Bilateral and Regional Relations 
 
Although the Cardoso administration seemed to be more active in terms of 
multilateral talks and diplomatic activities in international organizations, it also paid a 
lot of attention to bilateral and regional diplomacy. Compared to the proportion of 
overseas stay for the inauguration period, while presidents of Sarney, Collor and Franco 
spent abroad 9%, 9.8%, and 5.2% of their time, respectively, Cardoso notched up 11.8%. 
(Folha de São Paulo, September 22nd, 2009). This is the reason why Cardoso’s 
diplomatic style is called "presidential diplomacy." 
As a main feature in terms of his destinations, Cardoso tended to travel more to 
developed nations such as the United States and Europe. The proportion occupied by 
these areas for all of stay number of countries was 49%. This is in contrast to his 
successor, President Lula, who went to more developing countries during his eight years. 
In relations with the United States, the traditional diplomatic partner for Brazil, US 
President Clinton (Bill Clinton) and Cardoso enjoyed six years of deep friendship as 
leaders of their countries. There were many confrontations in the relations between 
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Brazil and the United States during the Sarney government in the late 1980s, but 
Cardoso’s relations with the United States of the Clinton era were generally friendly. 
The United States was also an important trade partner for Brazil. For example, in 2002, 
the last year of the Cardoso administration, 25.4% of total Brazilian exports was 
destined for the United States [Koyasu 2004]. On the other hand, the traditional 
Brazilian diplomatic stance, which does not entirely follow the US, was maintained. 
Especially on the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011 during the Bush 
administration, Brazil made its attitude on the "war on terror" very clear. Brazil, in 
compliance with the Treaty of Inter-American Mutual Assistance Cooperation, would 
cooperate with the Unites States only if terrorism threatened the Western Hemisphere. 
In the Cardoso administration, the relationship with South America was also 
emphasized. Southern Common Market (Mercosul) at that time consisted of four 
countries: Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. It was established in 1995 when 
Cardoso started his administration. Mercosul was the nucleus of Cardoso’s South 
American diplomacy, and his aim was to promote South American integration.  
In August 2000, a South American Summit of the leaders of the 12 countries of 
South America was held in Brasília, the first time in history that all the leaders of South 
America had been called to meet together. President Cardoso, on the occasion of this 
summit, made a speech on the importance of South American integration since South 
American countries are the ones who knew the value of democracy and could share 
their problems of poverty and social injustice. Cardoso stated that South America should 
unite strongly to promote its economic development. This stance of prioritizing South 
American integration was also continued by Lula and Rousseff.  
In terms of the relationships with Asia, Cardoso visited China shortly after his 
first inauguration. Historically, the proportion of Brazilian trade with China was not so 
high. For example, in 2002, the ratio of imports from China was only 4.18% of total 
imports to Brazil [Koyasu 2004], but the trade with China has gradually expanded its 
share. In 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) which succeeded to 
make China a strategic trade partner for Brazil. 
In order to deepen the relationship between the Portuguese-speaking African 
countries, Brazil contributed to the launch of the Community of Portuguese Language 
Countries (CPLP) in cooperation with the government of Portugal in July 1996. Many 
Portuguese-speaking African countries were still suffering from political and economic 
instability even after their independence from Portugal in the 1970s, and Brazil sent 
many specialists in the areas of public health and medical assistance. In particular, 
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cooperation between Brazil and the CPLP countries on AIDS has been active. Toward 
Africa other than the Portuguese-speaking countries, the relationship with South Africa 
was expanded by the then-president, Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, and President Cardoso. 
President Mbeki was invited to the Mercosul summit in 2000 [Koyasu 2004]. 
 
2. The Lula Administration: The Real Turning Point of the New Brazil 
 
The author will explain that the Brazilian foreign policy became more active by the 
Lula government.  Lula not only participated actively in the global negotiations, but 
also had an objection to the present international order together with other developing 
nations. It was also a major change that the Brazilian foreign relations become more 
diversified under the Lula mandate. 
 
2.1. From “Participation” to “Diversification”   
 
In 2003, Brazil’s leader changed from Cardoso to Lula. President Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva grew up in a poor family and while he was working as a metal worker, he 
participated actively in the labor union, becoming a prominent leader among his 
comrades. Finally, when he was only 23 years old, he was elected to be the chairman of 
the 100,000 metal workers’ union in São Paulo. He led the democratic movement of 
Brazil, which happened in the first half of the 1980s, the so-called Diretas Já (a political 
movement to demand the direct election of the president) with the Workers' Party (PT), 
to which Lula belonged. Now a person who was completely different from Cardoso, an 
elite-born president, was to be inaugurated as the Brazilian president. 
The Brazilian business community showed some concern over Lula’s career as a 
union leader, saying that “when Lula was elected as president, economic policy might 
become more left-wing.” Also, many concerns about Brazil’s future were heard from the 
international financial community. In reality, President Lula inherited the economic 
policies of the Cardoso government. When he made clear that Brazil would have a 
pragmatic stance in macroeconomic policy, for example, economic stability, inflation 
control, the maintenance of a good relationship with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the international community’s concerns about the Lula government were almost 
swept aside. It is said that the change in Lula’s attitude was influenced by Cardoso who 
had persuaded the then-presidential candidate, Lula, to take into consideration the 
domestic and international situation surrounding Brazil and give up his more left-wing 
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policies [Koyasu 2009]. 
Although Lula followed the pragmatic economic policy of the Cardoso 
administration, with his foreign policy he tried to focus more on developing nations. 
This trend was especially much stronger during Lula’s first mandate (2003-2006). Since 
there was criticism from the PT of Lula’s orthodox economic policy, Lula intended to 
show a more PT leader-like stance in the sphere of foreign policy. During the Lula 
administration, diplomatic relations with Africa and the Middle East really flourished. 
Brazil’s diplomatic relations now became much more diversified. 
 
2.2. An active Foreign Policy to Be Reinforced:  
Seeking to Reform the Existent International Order 
 
During the Cardoso administration, an active participation in multilateral 
consultations, especially related to human rights treaties and disarmament became 
remarkable. The Lula administration, however, took a more active stance by seeking a 
new international economic and political order from which the south could benefit. A 
good example was the G4 (Japan, Germany, India and Brazil), which was formed to 
press for the reform of the United Nations Security Council. These four countries 
strongly pushed for an increase in the number of permanent Security Council members 
since the present Security Council did not reflect the power balance of global politics in 
the 21st century.   
As another example was the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) 
negotiations. The Summit of the Americas was inaugurated in December 1994 when 
President Bill Clinton was in the White House. The first meeting was held in Miami 
where all the nations of the Western Hemisphere participated, with the exception of 
Cuba. The FTAA initiative was proposed by President Clinton at this first Summit.  
However, the negotiations stagnated and the original plan to launch the FTAA in 2005 
was almost impossible.  On the 4th Summit of the Americas at Mar de La Plata in 
Argentina, November 2005, while the United States, Mexico and the Central American 
countries were for the proposal about the reopening of the FTAA negotiations, the 
Mercosul members, especially Brazil, were reluctant to agree to it. The final declaration 
was very unusual in that both the opinions for and against were incorporated.   
Many in Latin America, including Brazil, made a complaint that the FTAA would 
be more advantageous for the United States. Brazil, in any case, had felt reluctant about 
the FTAA from the very beginning [Poggio Teixeira 2011] and it is noteworthy that 
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President Lula was one of the main members to say “no” to the US-led FTAA 
negotiations 
In the WTO negotiations, Brazil often tried to correct the process of multilateral 
talks mostly led by developed countries. On the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancún, Mexico, September 2003, President Lula launched the Group of 20 (we often 
call it the “commercial version of the G20” in order to distinguish it from the financial 
G20 version) composed of 20 developing countries which are opposed to the 
agricultural subsidies by developed countries’ governments. It was President Lula who 
called on the agricultural countries of the South to gather and participate in the WTO 
ministerial conference at Cancún. Brazil called for the industrialized countries to 
recognize that the inequality between the developed and developing countries have not 
been eliminated as long as trade rules such as on agricultural subsidies are preserved. 
Compared to the Cardoso diplomacy, these cases clearly represent Brazil’s strong 
attitude toward a globalized society. 
However, it should not be overlooked that the Cardoso administration also called 
for the reduction and elimination of agricultural subsidies by the developed countries at 
the WTO conference at Doha in 2001. At that time, both the developed countries and the 
developing countries started a new round of negotiations, the so-called Doha Round. 
Brazil was one of the main countries who tried to put the agricultural subsidies’ issue 
onto the agenda. The Cardoso government was highly regarded as a key actor in starting 
the Doha Round and in trying to get both the abolition of agricultural subsidies and the 
possible limitation of patent protection for medicines onto the table.   
Lula’s assertiveness was to continue well into his second term (2007-2010). In 
November 2008, the so-called financial G20 held a meeting in Washington, DC. One 
week before, when the G20 countries’ finance ministers and the presidents of the central 
banks gathered in São Paulo, Brazil, where the chair was, Brazil also attended adopting 
a firm position toward the developed nations. The commemorative photo, in which Lula 
is standing in the center with President Bush, is very impressive. In the following year, 
when the G20 summit was held in London, Brazil, with China, could still play a leading 
role.  
Participation in the multilateral talks during the second term of President Lula 
was greater than in his first term. Brazil had many opportunities to participate in such 
multilateral arenas, and the international community increasingly thought that it could 
not solve global issues without the emerging countries. During the Lula administration, 
Brazil showed a stable economic growth and decreased slightly inequalities in income 
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distribution. Historically plagued by the repayment of debt to international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and the West, Brazil has now changed from being a debtor 
country to being a creditor. Due to the commodities’ boom (for example, in soy, chicken, 
oranges, iron ore, and bioethanol), Brazil could become one of the world’s leading 
exporters. With the Cardoso administration, the international community’s reliance on 
Brazil began to grow, but it became even greater during Lula’s administration.  
 
2.3. South-South Relations  
 
The Brazil of the Lula government tried to find partners that might share its ideas 
and positions. It is interesting that Celso Amorim, the foreign minister of the Lula 
government, commented that “to make friends (amigos) with anyone is Brazilian’s best 
skill" [Dauvergne and Déborah Bl Farias 2012], and forming relationships with 
developing and emerging countries was one of the major features of Lula’s foreign 
diplomacy. For a long time, as everyone knows, Brazil had been tackling many social 
and economic problems, such as poverty, economic inequality and social injustice. By 
applying these experiences to its foreign policy, Lula intended to advance south-south 
cooperation and support southern countries that were facing the same challenges as 
Brazil.  
By the way, Lula’s foreign policy is often compared with the one of the Geisel 
government (1974-79). The foreign policies of Geisel in the 1970s were called 
Ecumenically Responsible Diplomacy (pragmatismo ecumênico responsável) [Horisaka 
1993]. Its main features were to have diplomatic relations with a variety of countries 
and nations. The concept of economic pragmatism was a priority for Brazil, not an 
ideology. Even though Brazil was a member of the west and a capitalist nation, Brazil 
did not necessarily follow the United States, but, at the same time, it was also reluctant 
to construct a solidarity movement with countries from the South.  
The foreign policies of the Lula and Geisel governments can be said to share a 
common point in terms of being “ecumenical” (= multidimensional). However, since 
Lula’s diplomacy prioritized south-south relations, his diplomacy was a little bit 
different from that of Geisel, who was reluctant to create solidarity with the South. 
Cardoso, also, was not active in promoting south-south relations. Rather, as already 
mentioned, Cardoso intended to obtain confidence in Brazil through creating strong 
relationships with developed countries, including the US and Europe  
In other words, the emphasis on South-South relations was an important change 
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introduced by the Lula administration. The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum 
(IBSA), the South American-Arab Nations Summit, The South American-African 
Countries Summit are examples of Brazil and southern nations cooperating in order to 
be more autonomous while also sending a message to the rest of the world. In terms of 
the characteristics of each meeting, we can point to language (CPLP, for example), 
geography (Mercosul, UNASUR, and CELAC, for example), and history (the 
Ibero-American Summit, for example). Of the various meetings, IBSA is very novel 
since three nations (India, Brazil, and South Africa), completely different in terms of 
language and geography, are united. As an inter-regional institution, IBSA was 
constructed in order to tackle global issues from the South’s point of view. IBSA is an 
institution of democratic nations; therefore it can be clearly distinguished from BRICS, 
of which China is a member. 
South America was also important in terms of finding diplomatic partners. As 
already mentioned, the Cardoso government laid the path for South America integration 
and the Lula government accelerated all the processes related to this integration. The 
South American Community, which was created in December 2004, was renamed the 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in April 2007. On May 2008, the Treaty 
of the Union of South American Nations was adopted in Brasília during an 
extraordinary session of the UNASUR Summit. UNASUR was created as a place where 
the twelve South American nations could unite and cooperate with each other in order to 
tackle common goals, such as democracy, poverty eradication and social justice.  
In Mercosul, which has experienced many crises like the trade conflict between 
Argentina and Brazil, there is a structure called FOCEM (Mercosul’s Fund for 
Structural Convergence), a foundation to redress economic imbalances among Mercosul 
countries [Pautasso 2012].  
The completion of UNASUR is also a reflection of Lula’s idea that South 
America is an important diplomatic arena. For the Lula government, initiatives to 
promote the unity of South America were essential for Brazil to having a much stronger 
voice in the international community as a global player.  
 
3. Rousseff’s Foreign Policies during her First Mandate:  
Its Limited Outcomes 
 
Now the author explains the Rousseff’s foreign policy (1stmandate: 2011-2014). 
Before describing the South-South diplomacy and South America integration of 
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Rousseff government, it will be explained the study abroad program, Science without 
Frontiers (Ciência sem Fronteiras) launched under the leadership of Rousseff.  During 
the Lula administration, Rousseff was a key cabinet member in posts such as the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary. She tried to inherit Lula’s diplomatic strategy, in which Science 
without Frontiers was newly introduced by her government. Roussef intended to 
maintain Brazil as a global player by focusing on relations with Latin America, 
strengthening relationships with emerging and developing countries, especially Africa 
and the Middle East, and by participating in regional and multilateral talks.  However, 
as the author explains later, the foreign policies of the Rousseff administration were 
often seen inactive and sometimes inconsistent.   
 
3.1. Ciência sem Fronteiras: The Program Emphasized in her Foreign Policies 
 
Economic development and diplomatic relationships are traditionally strong in 
Brazil. President Rousseff, after taking office, soon released a new national study 
abroad program, Science without Frontiers, whose main purpose was to help excellent 
Brazilian undergraduates, doctoral and post-doctoral students and also researchers in 
areas such as science, medicine and engineering to study abroad1. The program was to 
issue 100 thousand scholarships by 2015, but one more important purpose was to raise 
the level of Brazil's science and technology and innovation. This Science without 
Frontiers program was a matter of foreign policy due to the fact that in planning to send 
Brazilians abroad, it also promoted Brazil’s economic development and 
internationalization. In her presidential address to Congress in January 2014, Rousseff 
emphasized that this program would form an important agenda in her diplomatic 
relations with countries that had high-levels of science and technology. Rousseff often 
visited countries where there was a possibility of sending Brazilian students and 
scholars. This might be one reason why she visited more developed countries than 
developing ones.  
In March 2011, when Rousseff visited Obama in the United States, they agreed 
that it would be important for the US and Brazil to expand the study abroad program for 
students and scholars in the fields of science and technology between the US and Brazil.  
                                                 
1 Since the fall of 2013, Japan is also accepting the Brazilian students and scholars. According 
to the information of Jasso (Japan Student Overseas Organization), as of January 2015, there are 
about 268 Brazilian undergraduates students at universities in Japan.  
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The United States also introduced a study abroad program for inter-American 
nations in 2011, "100 thousand strong in the Americas," which was almost same as 
Brazil’s Science without Frontiers. Through collaboration between the governments of 
the United States and Latin American nations, their companies and their universities, the 
program would send 100 thousand US students to study in Latin America. In the 
US-Brazil presidential meeting held in Brazil, both Obama and Rousseff stressed that 
the US program would complement Brazil’s.   
Science without Frontiers, with its aim to raise Brazil’s level in science, 
technology and innovation, was not a point of discussion with the developed countries 
alone. It was also discussed with emerging nations such as China and India. For 
example, when Rousseff visited China to participate in the 3rd BRICS summit in Sanya, 
China, she talked about it with the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, the day before the 
summit. Rousseff also attended a high-level conference on Brazil and China's science, 
technology and innovation. 
  
3.2. South-South Relations: Promoting Investment and Trade 
 
The core of the Lula administration’s South-South relations (mainly African 
countries) was cooperation in areas such as economic reconstruction, democratization, 
food and agriculture, and health. The economic development of the African region was 
indispensable for encouraging Brazilian companies to invest in Africa. It was also 
important to shore up support for Brazil’s plans for UN reform. An additional reason for 
why Brazil intended to strengthen its relations with Africa was Lula’s deep feeling of 
regret for Brazil’s colonial history (its negative heritage) as an importer of African 
people as slaves on Brazil’s sugar plantations [The Economist 2012 ]. 
Brazilian companies’ advance into Africa was remarkable even in the Lula 
administration. This occurred especially in Portuguese-speaking nations such as Angola 
and Mozambique. As a trading partner, Africa became important for Brazil. If we regard 
the region of Africa as a unit, it is Brazil’s fourth largest trading partner after China, 
Argentina, and the United States. 
Based on the Lula administration’s strong relations with Africa, Rousseff 
continued to engage in south-south diplomacy as the axis of Brazil’s foreign policy.  
Besides technical cooperation in the agriculture and food sector, Rousseff also intended 
to promote investment and trade activities. Not only did the leaders of 
Portuguese-speaking nations visit Brazil but non-Portuguese nations such as Guinea, 
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Tanzania and Benin also went to Brazil in 2011 and 2012, and Rousseff often talked 
with them about Brazilian private investment. In October 2012, Rousseff visited 
Pretoria where the IBSA summit was being held. While there, she also visited the 
presidents of South Africa, Mozambique and Angola to talk about Brazilian investment 
and trade. This might illustrate Rousseff’s diplomatic aim to involve business in Brazil’s 
south-south relations.  
Originally, for Africa, Brazil offered technical and economic cooperation as 
international aid. In particular, so-called triangular cooperation, where the partnership 
between Brazil and one more developed country offers economic cooperation to an 
African nation, was often carried out during the Lula administration. In particular, the 
economic cooperation among Japan, Brazil and Mozambique, called ProSAVANA 
(Mozambique tropical savanna agricultural development) was based on the experience 
of Japanese-Brazilian technical cooperation in the 1970s that developed the so-called 
Cerrado, the center-west region of Brazil. These styles of triangular cooperation were 
inherited by the Rousseff administration. Besides Africa, this approach was extended to 
Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Oceania. Partners with Brazil at present not 
only include developed nations such as Japan, the United States, Spain, Canada, 
Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, but also developing countries like Israel 
and Egypt. 
 
3.3. South American Integration  
 
Since the Cardoso and Lula administrations, South America has become an 
important diplomatic axis, and the Rousseff administration continues this strategy. 
According to the US political think-tank, CSIS, “Since Lula took office in 2003, the PT 
has focused on the strength and consolidation of Brazil’s influence over South America. 
From the perspective of the PT, what ultimately gains traction with their base is the 
notion that South America’s problems should be discussed and solved by South 
American countries – under Brazil’s leadership.” About UNASUR, CSIS explained this 
as follows: 
 
From the perspective of PT, the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR) remains the region’s essential diplomatic project. Based on the premise 
that isolation is unproductive for solving problems, Dilma’s foreign policy for the 
region has been based on the adoption of a persuasive approach to preserving 
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democratic order in the region. UNASUR integration has, in turn, a robust 
ideological component that joins the countries ruled by center-left governments, 
driving Brazil’s greater attentiveness to the region under Lula and Dilma. [Meacham, 
Carl and Hussein Kalout 2014, 3] 
 
Brazilian foreign policy researchers, for example, Gratius and Saraiava, explained 
that there are three dimensions to Brazil’s South American diplomacy: the relationship 
with Argentina, Mercosul and the South American summit, and UNASUR. These three 
dimensions are mutually related [Gratius and Saraiava 2013]. According to the 
UNASUR Treaty, it is important to understand that the process of South American 
integration should be based on the efforts which Mercosul and the Andean Community 
experienced in the making of their own regional integrations2.  
In other words, Mercosul and UNASUR involve inter-related processes. Also, the 
objective of UNASUR “is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an 
integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political 
fields, prioritizing political dialogues, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, 
financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socioeconomic 
inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion and the participation of civil society, to 
strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of strengthening 
the sovereignty and independence of the States.” [Treaty of the UNASUR, 2nd article]3  
Mercosul and UNASUR are not the same, since the former is about economic 
integration (the Customs Union). However, they can be regarded as being the same in 
terms of their objectives and background. Therefore, it is not possible to consider 
Mercosul as the same as NAFTA, simply an agent of economic integration. This way of 
thinking might have strongly influenced Rousseff, who considered Mercosul not merely 
as an economic integration.  
  
                                                 
2 On UNASUR, refer to the following sites for the established treaty text (Portuguese version). 
Tratado Constitutivo da UNASUR http://www. 
itamaraty.org.br/temas/america-do-sul-e-integracao-regional/UNASUR?last viewed, August 1st, 
2014?. 
3Tratado Constitutivo da UNASUR(artículo 2 objetivo). 
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3.4. Inactive Foreign Policies under the First Mandate of Rousseff Government 
 
Strategically, Rousseff’s diplomacy remained unchanged. The foreign policy staff 
did not change drastically. Above all, Marco Aurélio Garcia who had supported Lula 
diplomacy continued to remain as a Diplomatic Advisor and Celso Amorim, the foreign 
minister during the eight years of the Lula administration also stayed, although not as 
foreign minister.  
However, diplomacy during Rousseff’s administration, compared to that under 
Lula, seemed to be less salient. The ex-Foreign minister, Antonio Patriota, said that 
“now Brasília could become a city where diplomacy could develop.” It is also true that 
Rousseff, while not visiting so many countries, received many foreign nations’ leaders 
in Brasília. However, Veja, a famous Brazilian magazine, said that during Rousseff’s 
first three years, she welcomed only one third of the global leaders that Lula did. Even 
though Rousseff stressed the importance of South American Integration, the number of 
her visits to South American nations was clearly less than Lula (Veja, July 30th, 2014).  
Strategically Rousseff diplomacy seems the same, but it has had fewer visible 
results. Why has Brazil become far from active in its foreign policy?  In the author’s 
opinion, there may be two reasons: 1) The domestic economic situation has changed, 2) 
the international situation has also changed and become more complicated. 
First of all, we consider the change in the domestic economy when Rousseff took 
office in 2011. According to Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the 
economic growth rate in 2011 was 3.9%, compared to 7.6% in Lula’s last year, 2010. 
While the economic recovery was a most important issue for the Rousseff government, 
the downturn in Brazil’s economy led to the degradation of Brazil’s image in the global 
community. Given such a fragile situation, it was difficult for Brazil to speak out so 
actively in multilateral meetings. Unlike Lula, who could personify Brazil’s economic 
boom in his foreign relations. 
Second (and a more serious reason than the first) was the change in international 
relations. The G20, which includes Brazil and several emerging nations, was started 
during Lula’s second administration, and it certainly had momentum. The G20 was 
expected to herald an alternative international economic order for the G7, but, as time 
passed, it experienced difficulties. A consensus was often not reached. The conflict 
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between the advanced economies and the developing economies remains unsolved. 
Now the G20 as an institution cannot be said to function as well as before4. 
In the complicated international relations, such as Russia’s territorial expansion 
(Ukraine and Crimea) and the instability of Middle East politics, it seemed difficult for 
Brazil to actively commit in the global agenda. 
Once the Lula administration, whether rightly or not, was active in foreign policy 
toward the Middle East. He said that Brazil could contribute to solve the problems of 
both the Arabs and Israel by bringing peace to the region. Lula, in collaboration with 
Turkey, tried to commit to the problem related to Iran’s nuclear development in order to 
prevent the international community from imposing economic sanctions on Iran. 
However, Rousseff was inactive in terms of the agenda of Iran’s nuclear development. 
In other cases, she tried to show her commitment to the Middle East issues by 
saying that Brazil denounced Israel’s invasion of Gaza and its "disproportionate use of 
force.” A spokesman from Israel’s foreign ministry strongly criticized Brazil calling it a 
diplomatic dwarf (anão diplomático). Israel also said that it regarded Brazil as an 
irrelevant partner and criticized Brazil for not understanding the Middle East situation at 
all. On one hand Rousseff’s attitude seems to be inactive; inconsistent on the other. 
     As a famous diplomat, José Botafogo Gonçalves, said, Rousseff seems to dislike 
international relations and her foreign policy can be characterized as lacking a clear 
direction. In the middle of a complicated international political scene, Rousseff 
sometimes did nothing and sometimes behaved inappropriately, which has led to Brazil 
being criticized and doubted [Veja, July 30th, 2014]. 
 
3.5. World Cup Diplomacy: The Return of the New Brazil’s Foreign Policy? 
 
On the occasion of final game and closing ceremony of World Cup, Rousseff met 
actively with the leaders of various nations, including Chancellor Angela Merkel of 
Germany and President Vladimir Putim of Russia. Following the closing ceremony of 
World Cup, Rousseff hosted the leaders of BRICS nations in Fortaleza where their sixth 
BRICS Summit was held. This meeting was important because of the agreement to 
establish the New Development Bank (the so-called BRICS Bank) and the Contingent 
Reserve Agreement (CRA). Also, for the first time, BRICS and UNASUR had a joint 
meeting, and China, UNASUR and the representatives of CELAC met to reach an 
                                                 
4 An American political scientist, Ian Bremmer is such the world is called G-Zero World. 
132 The Post-New Brazil 
 
official agreement to start the CELAC/China Forum. As organizer, Rousseff could 
display Brazil to the world5. 
In retrospect, another important event brought Brazil back into the international 
community. On September 1st 2013, a former staff of the United States National 
Security Agency (US-NSA), Edward Snowden, revealed that the US had wiretapped 
President Rousseff. Due to the seriousness of this news, Rousseff canceled her official 
visit to the US, and the media revealed that the bilateral relationship had deteriorated. 
On September 24th 2013 in her speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
Rousseff strongly criticized wiretapping as an act against the International Human 
Rights Treaty (not mentioning the United States by name, however). Then, in November 
of the same year, in collaboration with Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had also been 
wiretapped, she proposed to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations a 
resolution related to the protection of privacy, and this resolution was adopted.   
After finishing the World Cup and the BRICS Summit, Brazil finally entered a 
presidential race. In this election, a dramatic incident occurred. One of the major 
presidential candidates, Eduardo Campos from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) died 
in an airplane accident during the election campaign. Marina Silva, the previous 
Campos team’s vice presidential candidate, decided to run. Finally, there was a runoff 
between Rousseff and Aécio Neves from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) 
and Rousseff won by a narrow margin.  
During the campaign, foreign policy was not the main focus for almost all the 
candidates. As mentioned before, Rousseff declared during her first mandate that she 
would continue Lula’s foreign policy strategy. She stressed the importance of South 
American integration, especially regarding integration through infrastructure and 
finance, besides trade. Mercosul was an issue in which she differed from her run off 
competitor, Aécio Neves from PSDB. In brief, Rousseff prioritized Mercosul as being 
an important pillar of Brazil’s South American policy, while Neves strongly proposed 
the need for reforms to Mercosul6. Rousseff won the election, and on January 1st 2015, 
she gave her inaugural speech, in which she reiterated the importance of strengthening 
the integration of South America [Portal Planalto 2015]. 
                                                 
5 On July 18th, Rousseff held talks with José Manuel Barroso, the chair of the European Union 
(EU). From July 13th, the closing ceremony of the World Cup until 18th, she moved quickly 
three cities which were Rio de Janeiro, Fortaleza and Brasília. 
6 The different stance toward economic integration including Mercosul was felt especially 
strongly among the business sector, such as the Nacional Confederation of Industry (CNI). 
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Concluding Remarks: What Is the Post-New Brazil’s Foreign Policy? 
 
The protest in July 2013 and its government response, together with the 
stagnation of the Brazilian economy are signs that the New Brazil has already started to 
change. How about foreign policy? Has that also changed? In the beginning, Rousseff 
intended to continue Lula’s active foreign policy, which had opened the way to Brazil 
becoming a global player, and then she also could embody the New Brazil. However, 
various situations around her finally caused problems for her tentative approach. In 
conclusion, the four years of Rousseff’s first mandate seemed to make Brazil less salient 
in the global arena. It is difficult at present to identify the turning point in this transition, 
but it is true that Rousseff’s first administration government and the internal and 
external environment surrounding her created the era of Post-New Brazil.  
     At the same time, we cannot say exactly what the Post-New Brazil stands for 
diplomatically. Even if Rousseff tried to follow Lula and seek the same objectives, she 
would not be able to achieve the same results. This is a Post-New Brazil, but we are not 
sure that this is what Brazilians really want. 
Now the world is also changing: the expansion of Islamic power not only in the 
Middle East but also in the world as a whole, Russia’s territorial expansion, the fall in 
oil prices and its consequences for oil-exporting nations, and the improvement in 
US-Cuban relations, etc. We cannot discuss the future of Brazil’s foreign policies 
without looking at these global changes. Especially, due to geographical proximity, the 
changes in the inter-American system (especially regarding Cuba and Venezuela as 
anti-American nations and their diplomatic orientation in the near future) will strongly 
affect Brazil.  
? Rousseff said in the interview to the Brazilian foreign policy magazine, 
Política externa that foreign policy might change since it is just one component of 
national (or government) policy. Rousseff also talked about what conditions might give 
a change in foreign policy. According to her, this depends on developmental strategies 
introduced democratically and the global change in geography and economics [Política 
externa, September 19th, 2014]. Often in the past, Brazil's foreign policy was connected 
to economic development strategy. The main agenda of the year 2015 will be economic 
recovery for Brazil. Maybe there is no enough time to think about foreign relations. At 
least the second mandate of Rousseff administration will not be able to prioritize the 
foreign policy. The diplomacy of the Post-New Brazil will depend on the recovery of 
Brazilian economy.
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Table. A List of Middle East and African Nations Where Cardoso, Lula and 
Rousseff (1st mandate) Visited 
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Source: The author’s compilation. 
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